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Abstract 
 
The theme of this study is spatial mismatch, a concept that gave rise to an ever-expanding body of 
research concerned with how and why residential and employment distributions have shifted within 
cities and across metropolitan areas.  The concept grew out of John F. Kain’s research on how racial 
discrimination and segregation affects the spatial patterns of people/subgroups and jobs in the postwar 
American urban environment.  Specifically, “Housing Segregation” posits that housing-market 
discrimination is at the root of increased unemployment among inner-city, nonwhite workers; 
concurrently, the pace and volume of decentralization (of residents and employment) from central-cities 
reinforces low-income, overwhelmingly African-American isolation and immobility.  This study 
contributes to the New Orleans literature by providing a pre- and post-Katrina snapshot of spatial 
mismatch.  The analysis addresses research questions aimed at gauging the extent to which mismatch 
and job-isolation have changed for poor workers in the New Orleans metro area since Hurricane Katrina. 
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Introduction 
The central theme of this study is spatial mismatch, a concept that evolved over the course of 
the twentieth century and gave rise to an ever-expanding body of research concerned with how and 
why residential and employment distributions have shifted within cities and across metropolitan areas.  
The concept of spatial mismatch grew out of John F. Kain’s (year) research on how racial discrimination 
and segregation affects the spatial patterns of people/subgroups and of jobs in the postwar American 
urban environment.  Specifically, in his article “Housing Segregation”, Kain posits that housing market 
discrimination is at the root of increased unemployment among inner-city, nonwhite workers; 
concurrently, the pace and volume of decentralization (of residents and of low-skill/low-wage 
employment) from central-cities reinforces low-income, overwhelmingly African-American isolation and 
immobility.  Spatial mismatch theory holds that social and economic hardships (e.g., physical isolation, 
social exclusion, and poverty) faced by low-income and overwhelmingly black Americans residing in 
central cities can be directly linked to housing segregation (Kain "Housing Segregation, Negro 
Employment, and Metropolitan Decentralization").  Kain’s work coincided with the beginning of a period 
of widespread urban decay in central-cities throughout the U.S.; the hypotheses therein have been 
contested and modified over the subsequent decades (DeVise). 
The body of the spatial mismatch literature can be framed in one of two overarching contexts.  
First, there is a good deal of qualitative and quantitative analysis that hypothesizes as to causes and 
drivers of mismatch by identifying symptoms and operationalizing spatial mismatch for a given 
geographic unit and/or between subgroups.  The prevailing methodological approaches demonstrate 
and quantify mismatch according to the following indicators or proxies: the extent of residential 
segregation; variations in duration of trip-to-work; relative household or per capita income and 
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comparison of earnings; distance and proximity of underemployed workers to suitable jobs; and spatial 
experiments, whereby individual-level data and longitudinal data are used in tandem  (Houston).  The 
second dimension of the spatial mismatch research is dedicated to evaluating the effectiveness and 
overall impacts of policy intervention intended to redress the chronic issues and disparities that 
characterize spatial mismatch. 
 
Purpose and Significance of the Research 
Following Hurricane Katrina the New Orleans metropolitan area experienced, concurrently, a 
contraction of its total population and a drastic decline in the total number of primary jobs; and a high 
volume of and tendency toward relocation and redistribution among residents and on the part of firms 
throughout the MSA.  The disaster resulting from Hurricane Katrina, both figuratively and rather literally, 
presented leaders and policymakers with an unprecedented opportunity to seize the city as a social 
engineering experiment.  Political leaders continue to encounter a number of controversial and 
politically-charged issues related to what are arguably the most important (and interrelated) facets of 
the post-disaster policymaking: spatial planning and social policy.  The New Orleans metropolitan area 
has undergone a considerable transformation since August 2005, from catastrophe and displacement to 
recovery and rebuilding.  But who are the winners are losers in the new New Orleans? 
There is already a plethora of historic and post-Katrina scholarly research on black disadvantage 
and African-American disenfranchisement in New Orleans.  However, to date no existing research draws 
sufficient attention to the effects of Katrina on the metro area’s low-wage housing and labor markets.  
The purpose of this study is to gauge the extent to which mismatch and job-isolation have lessened or 
worsened for low-wage-earners living in the New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, LA metropolitan statistical 
area (MSA) since Hurricane Katrina.    This study contributes to the New Orleans literature, and to the 
literature stemming from the events of Hurricane Katrina, by providing a before-and-after snapshot of 
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low-wage spatial mismatch across the MSA’s seven parishes.  And the study contributes to the spatial 
mismatch literature by focusing the analysis not on the metro’s African-American population but on its 
low-wage-earning workforce. 
 
 Questions for Analysis 
  Ultimately, two questions shape the data analysis for this investigation and are intended to 
gauge whether and to what degree spatial mismatch for the New Orleans metro’s low-wage workforce 
has changed since Hurricane Katrina.  First, do low-wage earners suffer from more or less spatial 
mismatch post-Katrina?  I answer this by asking (1) whether  low-wage-earners in parishes with higher 
proportions of low-wage jobs, relative to overall jobs, suffer from less mismatch post-Katrina; and (2) 
whether a higher number of low-wage-earner residents, relative to the number of wage-earner 
residents overall, increase mismatch for low-wage workers by parish. Secondly, do low-wage-earners in 
suburban locations suffer from greater degrees of mismatch than those residing in the central-city? 
An overview of the origins of spatial mismatch hypothesis provides historic background on the 
concept and relates spatial mismatch theory to the urban development of New Orleans.  Next, the study 
examines the long-term effects of spatial mismatch and various mechanisms for addressing symptoms 
of spatial mismatch.  The study then focuses on the research design and justification for the methods of 
analysis.  Finally, the study measures post-Katrina mismatch for low-wage-earners in the New Orleans 
MSA and seeks to explain post-Katrina outcomes to date. 
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Systemic Roots of Spatial Mismatch 
 
Primarily in an effort to resuscitate the finance and construction sectors of the economy, the New 
Deal administration established the Home Owners Loan Corporation and subsequently the Federal 
Housing Administration (Mertins; Gotham).  Initially, regardless of fiscal capacity or credit worthiness, 
black Americans were excluded from homeownership, and racial covenants prohibiting settlement by 
blacks in new suburban communities were pervasive (Jones-Correa).  Black mobility was later 
constrained by way of redlining, a practice whereby lenders systematically restrict black home loan 
applicants to predominantly low-income, minority residential areas.  Exclusionary lending practices 
largely evolved in response to the first Great Migration and were codified by the New Deal policies 
under the FDR Administration (Gotham): the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) promoted, endorsed 
and lay the groundwork for exclusionary land-use regulation and  explicitly-unconstitutional lending 
practices that are the primary drivers of economic disparities within U.S. metropolitan areas that 
emerge by the latter part of the 20th century.  The concept of exclusionary zoning has emerged as an 
integral component in perpetuating residential segregation by race and ethnicity as well as income that 
typify the demographic contrast between U.S. inner- and central-cities and the suburban sprawl that 
now surrounds their peripheries.  The black population boom in urban centers “established the basis for 
the development of various legal devices, including zoning…”(Gotham 300-01).  Furthermore, policy 
dictating the proliferation of public housing that occurred across the U.S. resulted in exclusively siting 
developments in central-cities; following the conclusion of WWII, inner-city public housing became 
increasingly and overwhelmingly occupied by nonwhites and especially by black Americans. 
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Even before the dominance of car culture and leading up to the Depression Era, an influential 
political lobby comprised of banking professionals, auto and oil tycoons, and rubber manufacturers  
successfully catalyzed the abandonment of seemingly ‘outdated’ streetcar and trolley systems in cities 
across the country in favor of with buses (Vuchic).  Subsequently, the ‘auto-petroleum-construction 
hyper-sector’ served an essential role in increasing economic prosperity and stability in the U.S. 
following the conclusion of WWII (Mertins).  The profitability and indispensability of this sector to the 
national postwar economy meant that motorized transit (specifically, private motorized transit) rose to 
a position of preeminence on the federal transportation policy agenda.  But by the 1970s controversy 
over the environmental and social impacts of federal, state and local planning on the urban areas across 
the country grew feverishly.  One author goes so far as to cite highway building as “’the most powerful 
direct Federal action that has contributed to metropolitan decentralization and central city 
decline’”(Rabin).   
More importantly, motorist-centric urban planning has seriously crippled the mobility of those 
in poverty – especially those residing within depressed central-cities – who have limited or no access to 
private vehicles.  The combination of de facto and de jure racial segregation, local land-use and federal 
transportation planning, and bifurcated housing and lending policies brought about the 
disenfranchisement and immobilization of poverty-stricken, overwhelmingly black city dwellers and 
fueled metropolitan decentralization.  In turn, social scientists observed the effects of segregation and 
suburbanization on socioeconomic isolation and employment opportunities and outcomes for those 
whose housing choice was increasingly constrained to the core city. 
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“Housing Segregation” 
At a point in history when urban disinvestment and black isolation reached near-critical levels 
(Mertins), “Housing Segregation” presented an examination of central-city employment in Detroit and 
Chicago.  Kain hypothesized that black employment outcomes are adversely impacted by housing 
market segregation, which “(1) affects the distribution of Negro employment and (2) reduces Negro job 
opportunities” (176).  “Housing Segregation” points to the work of Taeuber and Taeuber on segregation 
indexes which reveals a growing tendency toward extreme residential segregation of major U.S. metro 
areas and demonstrates high degrees of nonwhite isolation and concentration in Detroit and Chicago 
(178).  With data drawn from the 1956 Chicago Area Traffic Study and the 1962 Detroit Area Traffic 
Study, the “Housing Segregation” research design designates 98 workplace zones across which Kain 
measures employment distribution (180).  The sample population consists of all workers employed in 
the 98 areas.    
In the statistical analysis, the percentage of employed residents who are black in a given zone is 
referred to as the “residence ratio”, and the percentage of workers who are black in a given workplace 
zone is referred to as the “employment ratio” (180).  Furthermore, Kain uses the residence ratio as the 
dependent variable against three independent variables: distance from the nearest ghetto to boundary 
of black residential area; distance from the major ghetto to boundary of black residential area; and the 
mathematical difference between the first two variables (182).  This yields an estimate of black job loss, 
calculated as a comparison between actual data and the estimated data that would result from an even 
jobs-to-people distribution or ratio across the respective study areas in Detroit and Chicago (with 
populations of roughly 938,000 and 1.8 million, respectively) (190).  Kain focuses on occupational 
category by worker race, with income group categorizations based on predetermined industrial and 
occupational classifications, and by distance of employment from the center of the city’s major ghetto 
(187). 
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The results indicate that black workers in the Detroit metro area fare slightly better than their 
counterparts in Chicago, in being less constrained by housing in Detroit.  And despite having a 
population nearly half the size of Chicago’s, not only is Detroit’s ghetto “larger and more extensive” than 
Chicago’s, but Detroit also contains “more and better-located secondary ghettos”, and Kain concludes 
that, in general, Detroit suffers from a “lesser degree” of racial residential segregation (“Housing 
Segregation” 190).  For example, “Nonwhites were an estimated 4.6 per cent of all Chicago clerical 
workers in 1956.  Yet they were 78 per cent of all clerical workers employed” in one ghetto workplace 
zone alone (186). 
The data point to Chicago as a prototypical postwar American city: the postwar residential 
immobility of inner-city blacks in Chicago was coupled with huge disparities in employment change 
between the city and its suburbs (192).  For example, between 1948 and 1963, the Chicago metro area 
saw the number of wholesaling sector jobs increase by 27,000 while the Chicago’s central city lost 
roughly 17,000 wholesaling jobs.  And from 1950 to 1960, trends reflect little to no job growth in the 
retail sector for the Chicago metro area, but central-city retail employment fell by 40,000 jobs.  
Between 1947 and 1963 the number of manufacturing jobs in Chicago increased by 2,000, but 
the number of manufacturing jobs located in the central city declined by 180,000; at the same time, the 
distance from the city’s central ghetto to jobs in the manufacturing sector had begun to incrementally 
increase (194).  However – at least during the 1950s decade – it appears that the exodus of white 
Chicago residents occurred at a faster rate than did the departure of black jobs from the central-city.  
Nonetheless, the decline in total manufacturing jobs over this period (3,000) is still less than the decline 
in black employment, which Kain estimates to be between 4,000 and 7,000 (195).  Further complicating 
matters, the growth of the Chicago MSA’s black labor force increased at a much higher rate (by more 
than 31 percent) between 1950 and 1960 than did the metro area’s white labor force, which grew by 
less than four percent (196). 
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Twentieth-century metropolitan changes played out in New Orleans somewhat differently from 
cities like Detroit and Chicago.  In “River Trade”, Larsen observes that the city of New Orleans emerged 
as “a symbol of quick and easy wealth: construct docks, erect warehouses, dredge rivers, harvest crops, 
float them down to Louisiana” (113).  “River Trade” also acknowledges the degree to which the New 
Orleans labor market was governed by plantation dynamics: “not only was the *city’s+ capital… based on 
the value of slaves… but it was converted into planters’ paper” (Larsen).  The unsustainability of the New 
Orleans economy was bolstered by the institutionalization of Jim Crow following abolition and 
Reconstruction: systemic racial discrimination, and the disenfranchisement and marginalization of a 
sizeable segment of New Orleans’ population, further polarized labor-market and socioeconomic 
dynamics with unfavorable results for the city by the end of the 20th century.  One piece of research on 
employment shifts in the postwar twentieth century notes a tendency whereby “new industrial 
traditions… take root in places different from older ones” (Knudsen and Koh 376).  This is exemplified by 
the nature of the pre-Katrina New Orleans economy which, broadly, has always been driven by and 
dependent on natural resources, inexpensive labor, and outside capital.  Ultimately, the lack of a 
diversified postwar economy left the city in shambles by the end of the 20th century (especially as 
compared to neighboring major metro areas like Atlanta and Houston) – despite growth within the city 
of New Orleans from the 1930s through the 1960s, a period in which most major U.S. cities witnessed 
their populations begin to shrink. 
From a spatial perspective, the relatively slow pace of the city’s growth resulted from 
geographic limitations intrinsic to the region.  It was not until the early 1900s that the Wood pump 
allowed the city to facilitate drainage and residential expansion into previously unsettled and 
undeveloped areas (Spain; Warner).  Prior to this, many of the city’s residential areas did not enjoy 
access to basic public utilities such as sewerage and water (Landphair).  Moreover, the implications of 
elevation and topography throughout the city were largely racial and socioeconomic in nature.  Prior to 
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drainage innovations, there emerged a ‘nuisance-elevation’ nexus, a principle that guided residential 
settlement and land-use patterns: residential access was based on race and class, and areas of high 
elevation around the city were almost exclusively white.  “Inequity in the location of neighborhoods and 
in the distribution of flooding burdens appears early”(Kates et al.).  Before the 1920s, middle-income 
and affluent white residents occupied high-elevation- low-nuisance zones or otherwise nuisance-free 
areas of the city, located far from industrial and commercial activities located on the port1.   
From an economic perspective, the Port of New Orleans has always enjoyed the status of a 
major transshipment point, and antebellum New Orleans was the nation’s leading exchange and 
transshipment point; the city’s economy was driven by shipping and warehousing activities along the 
port at the edge of the French Quarter (Mosher, Keim and Franques).  This is significant, because this 
does not necessarily translate into the city or the region exporting goods and products – it only implies 
that the city serves as a site for exchange of goods.  Nonetheless, in contrast to postwar industrial cities 
of the northeast and the Great Lakes region after WWII, central-city employment remained stable and 
relatively high in many Southern cities (Mooney).  In ‘newer’ cities like Atlanta, Dallas, and Houston this 
was largely attributed to local annexation and inner-city growth; New Orleans actually experienced 
outward growth during this period.   
New Deal funding for public-works infrastructure led to job creation in the late 1930s and early 
1940s (Gonzalez-Perez).  New Orleans also became an ideal headquarters for major wartime industries, 
such as shipyard operations; and by 1945, the city had become the second-busiest port in the nation (R. 
Campanella, and Marina Campanella).  The durability of the inner-city job base was also due in large part 
to the delay of widespread white suburbanization, which did not occur en masse until after 1960 (as a 
response to federally-mandated integration); the city’s white population in 1940 remained relatively 
                                                          
1
 The relationship between race, socioeconomic status and elevation is reflected in the variations in the pace of 
post-Katrina recovery across the scores of neighborhoods that make up New Orleans. 
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high at seventy percent white (Mosher, Keim and Franques).  And the New Orleans population grew 
continuously throughout the first six decades of the twentieth century, reaching its peak at 627,525 
residents in 1960 (Cowan).  This prolonged positive rate of growth is a marked deviation from most 
national trends, particularly in the 1940s and 1950s, in that most major U.S. cities had already begun to 
lose population.  The city outperformed its counterparts until the early 1960s and did not experience its 
most drastic and devastating shrinkage until the mid-1980s2.  The silver lining for the postwar city of 
New Orleans, then, was that jobs suburbanized at a much slower rate than did residents.  Therefore, the 
spatial mismatch evidenced by Kain’s 1968 research did not emerge as rapidly as in more industrialized 
cities. 
  
“An Alternative Perspective” 
A year following the release of ”Housing Segregation”, Joseph D. Mooney’s research on spatial 
mismatch demonstrates the importance of and degree to which variations in quantitative and 
qualitative methodologies influence research outcomes.  “An Alternative Perspective” (Mooney) relies 
on data for the 25 largest metro areas to estimate how the exodus of jobs from central-cities affects job 
access for black working residents.  Whereas Kain’s work measures the impact of neighborhood racial 
composition on black employment outcomes by workplace zone in Detroit and Chicago, Mooney’s 
analysis uses an accessibility index (calculated by dividing the number of nonwhite city residents who 
commute to the suburbs by the number of nonwhite working city residents).  The author (1) finds that 
relative to aggregate demand, geographic isolation does not explain inner-city job outcomes, and (2) 
attributes suburban employment growth to the attractive “age of capital” (e.g., modern infrastructure 
                                                          
2
 In fact, between 1940 and 1989, the majority of states comprising the ‘Deep South’ did not even experience 100-
percent employment growth Daniel C. Knudsen and Taekyung Koh, "Assessing the Regulationist View of History: 
An Analysis of Employment Change in America, 1940-1989," Economic Geography 73.4 (1997).  Author and year is 
sufficient—include the full information in the bibliography. 
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bolstered by mortgage-lending and highway development) outside of cities – rather than neighborhood 
racial composition (310). 
Contrary to Mooney’s arguments, the suburbanization of jobs and of low-skill employment in 
the New Orleans metro area was a gradual process – and the postwar growth of New Orleans’s suburbs 
can be attributed to residential growth, rather than the redistribution of employment.  Highway and 
infrastructure development in and around the city was aimed at facilitating residential suburbanization; 
in fact, the city of New Orleans and not the suburbs was the target of postwar job growth.  The 25-year 
period following New Orleans’ population peak was marked by improved economic vitality and central-
city revitalization, on the one hand, and increasing socioeconomic disparities on the other (R. 
Campanella, and Marina Campanella; Lewis; Mosher, Keim and Franques). 
Many factors contributed to the gradual decline of one of America’s most influential and historic 
cities, despite the fact that – unlike many U.S. cities – saw continued population growth all the way 
through the 1960s.  The first challenge was the aging of the Port of New Orleans, whose facilities grew 
increasingly outdated.  Lacking a significant number of jobs in the industrial and manufacturing sectors, 
New Orleans’ increased reliance on foreign trade coincided with advances in maritime technology that 
both increased the capacity of maritime vessels and resulted in decreased volume of port traffic.  The 
declining postwar economic prosperity and significance of the port coincided with the declining 
importance of rail and the gradual dominance of highways and trucks on the distribution of commercial 
goods. 
Another development outweighing the redistribution of low-wage employment were the local 
and regional political elections of the early 1960s, which were marked by segregationist platforms and 
figureheads (Leavitt).  School-districting worked to solidify the racial makeup and poor quality of the 
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City’s public school system3 and public housing sites (Gonzalez-Perez; Mahoney).  Concurrently, for 
decades following mandated integration, the federal agenda was dominated by the rise of “Racial 
Republicanism”, a political alliance with Deep South roots whose formation was fueled by “the fear of 
equality and integration felt by Northern, Western, and Southern whites” and whose influence was 
evidenced by “sustained attempts to break off numerous social contracts: the New Deal; the War on 
Poverty; the Great Society; affirmative action; union shops; collective bargaining; the minimum wage; 
welfare; civil rights enforcement; employment programs; urban and rural assistance; social security; and 
health, safety, and environmental regulations” (McKittrick).   
Another contribution to metropolitan changes in postwar New Orleans economy was the 
transformation of the city’s downtown, the epicenter of which was Canal Street.  Formerly a thriving 
business and retail center, plummeting property values in the CBD – coupled with the proliferation of 
the automobile – prompted the conversion of a good deal of land in and around the CBD and French 
Quarter to parking lots (R. Campanella, and Marina Campanella).  The proximity to downtown of public 
housing further contributed to the decay of New Orleans’ downtown: the exodus of retail outpaced the 
exodus of downtown employment (Lewis), and by the 1960s, many merchants who remained catered 
almost exclusively to low-income and black public housing residents from the nearby Iberville and Lafitte 
Developments (Mosher, Keim and Franques).  The segregation of the public housing market in New 
Orleans, and separate public facilities for blacks and whites in general, were also costly endeavors for 
the city – especially considering that by the late 1950s, the New Orleans public housing population was 
almost exclusively African-American (Gonzalez-Perez; Mahoney). 
Around the same time, conflict between the forces of highway building and historic preservation 
brought about the displacement of hundreds of black residents in the city’s historic Tremé 
                                                          
3
 By 1980, the New Orleans and Detroit public school jurisdictions boasted merely 12 percent white student 
enrollment (Farley). 
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neighborhood for the sake of Interstate 10 Claiborne Expressway, expanding access to the CBD and 
destroying a stable working-class black community.  The French Quarter became the focus of an 
increasingly successful marketing campaign designed to draw tourists and conventioneers to the city.  
And since 1970, the lower end of Canal Street is the epicenter around which tourist and cultural 
attractions have been constructed, including a multitude of hotels, an aquarium, and most recently 
Harrah’s Casino.  Meanwhile, the development of the Superdome at the end of Poydras Street 
cemented the thoroughfare as the epicenter of the new CBD; and professionals relocated to new office 
buildings that lined Poydras during the city’s ‘Oil Boom’, which peaked in the mid-1980s (Lewis). 
     
 
Long-Term Effects of Racial Segregation and Employment Decentralization 
 
Kain and Mooney were among the first to successfully link housing segregation to black 
employment outcomes.  However, the authors’ findings differ slightly: while “Housing Segregation” 
illustrates a relationship between race, job proximity, and employment outcomes, “Alternative” implies 
that the attractiveness of the suburbs – rather than increasing nonwhite residential concentration in 
central-cities and/or white flight – has fueled job decentralization.  Subsequent to the 1960s research, 
the spatial mismatch literaure covers a wide range of policy issues in an attempt to tease out the 
prevailing symptoms and effects of residential segregation and racial discrimination in the housing 
market on the postwar urban black experience.  Among the most prevalent are: disparities in 
educational attainment and academic performance (Kain "A Pioneer's Perspective on the Spatial 
Mismatch Literature"); disparities in income level (J. B. Strait; Kain "A Pioneer's Perspective on the 
Spatial Mismatch Literature"; Chapple); concentrated poverty and social isolation (Massey and Denton; 
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Greene; Wilson; Goering and Feins); job-search behavior (Elliott; Covington; Stoll and Raphael); and 
regional variations (Massey and Denton; Martin). 
 
Spatial Mismatch: A Longitudinal Investigation 
Some point to race as the primary determinant of socioeconomic mobility, and that accordingly 
it is a more accurate predictor of “variations” in employment patterns than is spatial proximity to jobs 
(Blumenberg).  Still others, like Stoll in “Spatial Mismatch, Discrimination, and Male Youth Employment”, 
adopt the position “that place and not race explains blacks’ joblessness in central cities” (77).  The 
inherent endogeneity of the race-versus-place discussion has fueled an enormous amount of debate and 
research.  In an undertaking aimed at addressing the answer to the place-or-race question, Richard W. 
Martin presents readers with a comprehensive overview of late twentieth-century metropolitan change 
in “Spatial Mismatch and the Structure of American Metropolitan Areas, 1970-2000.”  The purpose of 
Martin’s longitudinal study is to determine whether employment growth in suburban America attracted 
new residents to its proximity, or whether suburban employment growth pushed residential 
development to even farther distances during the three decades following John F. Kain’s seminal work in 
1968.  Broadly, R.W. Martin finds that while black workers are increasingly chasing jobs across U.S. 
metropolitan areas, whites exhibit a tendency to move increasingly farther away from centers of high 
employment growth – typically peripheral suburban enclaves (1) that were once exclusively residential 
and white, and (2) whose low-wage employment density gradually increased in the postwar decades.   
The mixed SMI values are ultimately employed to calculate the degree to which change in SMI 
values for the study sample and geographic areas are attributable to employment shifts or population 
shifts.  The relationship between the two distributions can be driven by two factors: employment-driven 
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convergence (EDC) or population-driven convergence (PDC)4.    Finally, Martin uses regression analysis to 
determine whether SMI values are affected by (1) population size and number of counties per MSA, and 
(2) the percentage of black population per unit of analysis (484-85). 
Broadly, R.W Martin finds that from 1970 to 2000, employment shifts tended to reduce overall 
average SMI values but tended to increase black average SMI values.  And population shifts over this 
time period tended to increase overall average SMI values while they decreased black average SMI 
values (473-74).  In other words, employment has been shifting away from black residential areas.  Also, 
population shifts imply that blacks in general may have responded by moving toward employment 
centers while the overall population is locating farther away from these hubs.  In his regression analysis, 
Martin determines that population size of the MSA, number of counties per MSA, and percentage of 
black population per MSA are found to be positively related to SMI values: larger cities and metro areas 
exhibited greater spatial distance between residences and employment centers (476). 
 
 
Policy Response to Spatial Disadvantage and Racial Disparities in Labor-Force 
Participation 
The most prevalent policy mechanisms point to a consensus among policymakers that place – 
not race – is the primary determinant of inner-city employment outcomes (Keels et al.; Kasarda; 
Chapple).   Dispersal strategies have a dual purpose, whereby they can alleviate the concentration of 
inner-city poverty and associated problems (e.g., rampant crime and unemployment) as well as bring 
low-wage residents closer to low-skill suburban jobs.  These programs, however, do not address job 
                                                          
4
 The employment-driven convergence value or EDC is calculated by subtracting the decade’s mixed SMI value 
from the start-of-decade SMI value.  Population-driven convergence or PDC is calculated by subtracting the end-of-
decade SMI value from the decade’s mixed SMI value (479-84). 
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placement or the prevalence of firm behavior and discrimination; nor do they address the issue of 
social/community acceptance.  More importantly, dispersal programs are often involuntary and are tied 
to plans for demolition or reduction in availability of public housing. 
Mobility strategies primarily focus on increasing the capacity of the low-wage workforce residing 
in the inner-city to travel to suitable employment without residential relocation.  One common example 
is policy aimed at mitigating mismatch by authorizing expansion of the public transit network in and 
around major cities to facilitate commuting for non-car owners.  These and similar strategies, such as 
subsidized ride-sharing programs, ignore the political dimensions of transportation choice and policy.  
For instance, policies that result in higher costs of fares by distance inherently limit employment 
opportunities for low-wage workers with lengthy commutes.  Moreover, transit provision favors those 
whose work schedules revolve around ‘normal’ business hours, while many low-wage-earners work 
part-time or otherwise work overnight, and non-professional jobs (Yago).  Nor do mobility strategies 
address the absence of key amenities for low-wage workers commuting out of the city, such as nearby 
childcare facilities.  And similar to dispersal strategies, they do not acknowledge the importance of 
increased local working rates, the potential benefits of which include reduced absenteeism and lower 
cost of labor(Immergluck).  Nonetheless, the concentration and isolation of public housing 
developments in central-cities has cemented the immobility of poor African-American heads-of-
household, single mothers, and welfare recipients (Stoll, Holzer and Ihlanfeldt) – whom one author 
identifies as the cornerstone of the urban black workforce (Farley). 
The third primary mechanism to alleviate spatial mismatch relies on the success of urban 
revitalization policy, which since its inception has suffered from (1) fragmented authority and 
implementation structure, and (2) inconsistent levels of funding and political commitment (Rabin; Yago).  
The target beneficiary of redevelopment programs is most commonly the city treasury rather than 
disadvantaged central-city residents.  Increasingly since the 1980s, urban revitalization projects have 
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been tied to business incentives aimed at diversifying firm payrolls or encouraging employment of local 
minority and/or disadvantaged residents.  However, the well-known residual effects of inner-city 
comeback tend to displace poor workers, either in the form of rising property values and costs-of-living, 
or otherwise as a result of HOPE VI projects that reduce the number of subsidized units upon 
redevelopment.  Even massive central-city developments like athletic stadiums and other 
recreational/entertainment attractions may only put a dent in joblessness and poverty among nearby 
residents; moreover these jobs are often seasonal in nature and subject to consumer demands.  These 
challenges are nowhere better exemplified than in New Orleans, whose African-American residents 
before the storm (1) were overwhelmingly poor, and (2) heavily dependent on jobs in the hospitality and 
retail sectors. 
 
Increased Nonwhite Mobility 
In general, who have been the winners and losers of policy response to spatial mismatch?  How 
have these policies and programs impacted spatial mismatch and for whom?  Urban policy, particularly 
at the federal level, has shaped two important dimensions of metropolitan change since the Civil Rights 
Era.  First, anti-discrimination legislation facilitated African-American suburbanization (albeit selective 
and piecemeal); and the 1970s decade witnessed a racial convergence in college enrollment and 
educational attainment between blacks and whites (Farley).  So a segment of the nation’s young African-
American population enjoyed a relatively high degree of residential mobility, and was armed with 
credentials and skills that arguably precluded them from the low-wage job market.  The exodus of the 
black middle-class from central-cities accelerated inner-city decline and fiscal crisis; by the end of the 
1970s, the majority of major U.S. cities were increasingly characterized by nonwhite majority and 
concentration of poverty.  
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 The second policy response to the post-Great Society urban problem was two-pronged.  
Operating under the place-not-race assumption, policymakers embraced strategies intended to 
decrease inner-city job isolation by (1) bringing low-income and public housing residents out to jobs and 
more economically diverse areas, and (2) incentivizing and encouraging development to bring firms and 
new infrastructure into cities and in closer proximity to low-income, low-skill, overwhelmingly nonwhite 
workers.  However, urban development and revitalization planning grew out of fiscal policymaking and 
the anticipated benefits to city treasuries, rather than out of social policymaking second. 
John F. Kain co-authored a number of studies on black urban housing choice in conjunction with 
the St. Louis Urban Renewal Agency from 1970 to 1975 in an effort to refine the prevailing methodology 
for measuring price discrimination.  The findings challenge the notion that “housing is a homogenous 
good” whose attributes are static across a metropolitan area (”Pioneer’s Perspective” 12). The 1970s St. 
Louis Community Renewal Study highlights a startling conclusion: assuming no appreciation, black 
homebuyers could expect their annual housing costs to increase by 30 percent.  Moreover, black 
homebuyers in predominantly low-income black areas paid on average five to six percent more than 
their white counterparts; and black renters in these areas paid on average 12 to 19 percent more than 
their white counterparts (”Pioneer’s Perspective” 12).  Lower homeownership rates among blacks help 
explain significant disparities in wealth between blacks and whites.  And as housing markets became 
increasingly more open to black ownership, by the late 1970s the price of homes had increased 
exponentially since the growth of mortgage brokering and rapid decentralization following WWII 
(”Pioneer’s Perspective” 13). 
Between 1980 and 1990, national trends demonstrated that employment firms increasingly 
moved toward suburban locations and away from urban black residents (Martin; Covington).  Over this 
same period, middle- and working-class black families became increasingly suburbanized, but this 
generally took place either in previously established black subdivisions or at the edges of predominantly 
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black inner-city neighborhoods (Kain "A Pioneer's Perspective on the Spatial Mismatch Literature").  
Moreover, black suburban communities tended to be equally as segregated as they were in the inner-
city (Stoll, Holzer and Ihlanfeldt 210).  The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act5 data catalyzed a number of 
governmental investigations, such as one commissioned by the Federal Reserve Board in 1983 that 
provides evidence of redlining (Dedman "The Color of Money. Follow-Ups and Reactions. Blacks Turned 
Down for Home Loans from S&Ls Twice as Often as Whites").  The Reserve Board findings indicate a 
relationship between applicants’ race, housing values, and the number of home loans granted.  Despite 
overall growth (albeit piecemeal) in black homeownership and suburbanization  over the last few 
decades of the twentieth century, similar studies in cities like Atlanta and Detroit found that home loan 
disparities actually increased between 1981 and 1986 (Dedman "The Color of Money. Follow-Ups and 
Reaction. Atlanta among 20 Worst Cities in Loan Inequities"). 
The suburbs, in the most common sense of the term, have historically been out-of-reach for 
most low- and moderate-income New Orleans black households.  And the neighborhoods that 
presented the most viable option for many black New Orleans residents lay primarily within city limits in 
peripheral residential areas that were formerly occupied by whites (J. B. Strait, Gang Gong, and Cherisha 
N. Williams).  Otherwise, pre-Katrina black decentralization and suburbanization was most prevalent at 
far reaches of the city and at just beyond its periphery (R. Campanella Geographies of New Orleans: 
Urban Fabrics before the Storm; R. Campanella "An Ethnic Geography of New Orleans").  This is true of 
areas like Gentilly and parts of New Orleans East: residential developments in the eastern half of the city 
sprouted in the 1960s and initially housed non-black, middle- and upper-class residents.  But the 
economic decline experienced by the gas and oil industries in the early 1980s prompted widespread 
foreclosures and mass exodus of whites from the relatively modern subdivisions (R. Campanella 
                                                          
5
 The advent of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) in 1975 required financial institutions to release 
records on the geographic location of properties, as well as the terms, of mortgage and home improvement loans 
(Canner et al., 1991). 
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Geographies of New Orleans: Urban Fabrics before the Storm; R. Campanella "An Ethnic Geography of 
New Orleans"; J. B. Strait).  One residential subdivision located in the Gentilly area – Pontchartrain Park 
– predates the inclusion of blacks in other sections of New Orleans East6.  Pontchartrain Park exemplifies 
an early Deep South, FHA-funded subdivision that was intended to assuage the political demands of a 
relative affluent, civically-mobilized segment of New Orleans’ black population. for affluent black 
residents (R. Campanella, and Marina Campanella; Hirsch). 
By the late 1990s city-center redevelopment and planning was bolstered by (1) a strong 
economy, and (2) a shift in consumer behavior and preferences, fueled largely by delays in marriage and 
childrearing among twenty- and thirtysomethings (Sander and Testa).  The back-to-the-city movement’s 
implications for affordability and housing choice in central-cities were far-reaching: low-income 
residents were potentially displaced due to gentrification and increased cost-of-living; and conversely, a 
booming economy enabled many inner-city moderate- and middle-income nonwhite households to 
relocate to more desirable suburban residential locations within the city and/or the suburbs.  Using 
Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) files from the 1990 and 2000 Census of Population and Housing for 
the Chicago metropolitan statistical area, Sander and Testa explore the relationships between race, 
educational attainment, and suburban versus central-city housing choice in another study of Chicago.  
The authors find that high educational attainment among whites is highly associated with central-city 
residential location, and that a larger percentage of whites with at least an undergraduate degree reside 
within the city, rather than living in the suburbs.  The authors find that, conversely, high educational 
attainment among blacks and Hispanics is associated with suburban residential location; and a larger 
percentage of blacks with at least an undergraduate degree reside in Chicago’s suburban areas than in 
                                                          
6
 The central feature of the Pontchartrain Park development was a blacks-only golf course (the completion of 
which did not occur until after the declaration of a federal mandate for racial integration that grew out of Brown v. 
Board) in a prototypical suburban setting; the subdivision emerged as a black middle-class stronghold whose well-
to-do constituency generally opposes multi-family and commercial development (Bates). 
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the city itself.  These findings clearly indicate a reversal from the prototypical postwar racial residential 
distribution.   
“Spatial Mismatch, Discrimination, and Male Youth Employment” takes into account individual 
residential location, individual personal characteristics (such as academic achievement), and individual 
family characteristics to determine (1) the extent to which suburban residential location affects the 
probability of male youth employment, and (2) the extent to which the probably of youth employment 
is a function of these three variables (Stoll).  He finds that while black male youth in the D.C. suburbs 
fare better than their inner-city counterparts, they do not achieve the same level of employment as 
white suburban male youth.  Stoll’s work here serves as a counterargument to the potential for 
improved economic and employment opportunities of nonwhite suburban residents evidenced by 
Sander and Testa. 
 In ”What Spatial Mismatch?”, Cohn and Fossett rely on data from 1979 to 1981 and indicate 
that, in Boston and Houston, job search radii for blacks and whites are actually quite similar, and the 
research actually suggests that blacks have greater access to entry-level employment than do whites 
overall (Cohn and Fossett).  But the authors also assert that reliance on less convenient modes of 
transportation results in reduced commute distance.  Based on data from the 1980 U.S. Census Urban 
Transportation Planning Package dataset as well as the 1979 and 1981 annual housing surveys for 
Houston and Boston, respectively, Cohn and Fossett investigate black job access relative to residential 
location by examining commute distance by race for workers in Boston and Houston.  Their findings 
point to high centralization of jobs in general in both cities, as well as higher residential centralization 
among blacks than whites.  Cohn and Fossett conclude that although blacks in Boston and Houston are 
residentially segregated from whites and confined to central-cities, they are still in close proximity to 
concentrations of low-wage or “entry-level” employment than their white counterparts.   
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Using data on male employment levels in Cleveland and Milwaukee for the year 1990, 
Boardman and Field rely on measuring duration of commute – unlike Cohn and Fossett, who rely on 
commute distance – to determine the relationship, if any, between proximity to employment and male 
joblessness (Boardman and Field).Boardman and Field conclude that even though majority-black 
neighborhoods in 1990 in Cleveland and Milwaukee closer in proximity to entry-level jobs than white 
neighborhoods, workers residing in majority-black neighborhoods still tended to experience longer 
commutes on average.  The findings on Cleveland and Milwaukee also indicate that black residential 
areas exhibit higher unemployment levels – this is due in large part to the absence of reliable 
transportation networks and to low car-ownership rates among inner-city low-wage workers. 
In an investigation of employment distribution across the Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, and Los 
Angeles metro areas, findings indicate that welfare recipients, impoverished women with dependents, 
and those with low educational attainment persistently find themselves with low access to low-wage 
employment; while low-wage job availability in the suburbs of these metro areas is relatively high (Stoll, 
Holzer and Ihlanfeldt).  Relying on demographic and employment data from the U.S. Census, as well as 
data provided by local transit authorities for the year 2000, one author examines low-wage job access in 
the greater Buffalo, NY region measuring access to low-wage jobs assuming dependence on existing 
transport networks (Hess).  Hess finds that the Buffalo region’s central-cities enjoy higher job densities 
than do suburban locations, and goes on to observe that their central-city residents are in closer 
proximity to a higher overall proportion of jobs – despite higher numbers of low-wage jobs in the 
suburbs.  Nevertheless, Hess’s findings are also indicative of high centralization of poverty within these 
central-cities; moreover, access to motorized transport is much lower among inner-city blacks in 
poverty.  However, African-American adults in poverty have poorer access to automobiles than whites in 
poverty. 
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In the New Orleans MSA, the dispersal of the low-wage workforce has been bifurcated.  On the 
one hand, a good deal of impoverished white residents has gradually redistributed itself away from the 
city into St Bernard – whose population is characterized by nonwhite exclusion and a low-skill, low-wage 
workforce.  On the other hand, policy to alleviate the concentration of black poverty has been scant.  On 
the contrary, the center-city (Orleans Parish) has consistently been home to the majority of the MSA’s 
black residents.  And public housing has exclusively been sited in Orleans Parish, albeit one public 
housing development (Fischer) is located on the West Bank of the Mississippi River.  In terms of pre-
Katrina spatial mismatch, this has been fortuitous because the bulk of the metro area’s low-wage jobs 
were located in the city.  However, this is no longer the case in post-Katrina New Orleans. 
The absence of concrete policy to alleviate the plight of poor workers is increasingly significant in the 
post-Katrina MSA.  In New Orleans more than half of poor households did not possess a private 
motorized vehicle in 2000.  At the same time, poor households were less likely to receive housing 
assistance than other citizens in Louisiana as well as in the Southeast region of the country (Lowe and 
Shaw 806). 
 The Census data on commute mode by earnings7 indicate that the metro-wide post-Katrina 
workforce remains heavily reliant on cars to travel to work.  Significantly, the breakdown of commute 
mode by income bracket demonstrate that not only do low-wage workers overwhelmingly travel alone 
via private vehicle: by 2008, the percentage of poor workers earning less than $10,000 annually who 
commute alone via actually increased from 2004, while the proportion of commuters represented by 
those earning less than $15,000 annually increased slightly, from 23.2 to 23.7 percent, despite the post-
Katrina exodus of low-wage jobs from the New Orleans MSA.  This is an indicator of both the poor 
quality of transit provision throughout the MSA’s parishes, as well as poverty sprawl and the extent to 
which low-wage workers are residing farther from suitable employment centers. 
                                                          
7
 This is necessarily restricted to workers aged 16 and older, based on driving eligibility. 
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  Relocation Programs and Community Redevelopment 
 An investigation8 of the long-term outcomes and effects of Gautreaux relocation suggest overall, 
sustained quality-of-life improvements for participants and support the ‘place’ argument (Keels et al.).  
Using Census and crime data for the initial destination and most recent locations of participants whose 
relocations occurred between 1976 and 1989, the results of one study of the long-term outcomes of 
Gautreaux participants point to long-term improvements in neighborhood quality (Keels et al.).  
However, the authors note that participants’ current neighborhoods generally fit into one of four 
categories – according to low- or moderate-income and according to racial (black or white) 
predominance.  So while former public housing residents persistently resided away from low-income, 
high-poverty areas, they generally did not ascend to middle- or upper-middle-class areas.   
The significance of spatial proximity and job access is also demonstrable in “smaller metros… 
[that] have less mismatch than larger ones, perhaps because of shorter distances between jobs and 
housing” (Chapple 324).  The regression analysis and results in R.W. Martin’s “1970-2000” affirm that 
spatial mismatch is positively related to MSA size (e.g., the number of counties and square mileage) and 
the MSA’s total population (476).  “Overcoming Mismatch” states that where “spatial mismatch does 
exist, it does not necessarily follow that the main policy focus should be to reduce it.  If race is a far 
more important explainer of employment outcomes, for example, and it interacts with the locations of 
residents and jobs in space, intervening to bring people closer to jobs may have little impact” – rather, 
the appropriate “policy might better focus on chronic employment discrimination if increasing minority 
employment were the goal” (324).  On the contrary, Allard’s research on the effects of welfare reform 
                                                          
8
 The Gautreaux study fails to examine job proximity in relation to placement and current neighborhoods. 
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on low-income employment outcomes in Detroit affirms that “*r+ates of work among welfare recipients 
are positively related” to job access (1045). 
By the 1990s, the majority of public housing developments in New Orleans suffered not only 
from disrepair and non-maintenance but also from poor governance on the part of a notoriously 
ineffective housing authority (Mahoney).  Federally-driven programs such as HOPE VI have resulted in 
the demolition and/or refurbishment of a handful of housing projects, but data and research on the 
outcomes and effects of these efforts provide evidence that poor New Orleans residents have emerged 
worse off than they were prior to housing revitalization (Reichl).  Moreover, the case of the St Thomas 
redevelopment highlights the importance of gentrification and high value assigned to sections of the city 
in driving policy that dictates which projects are targeted.  HOPE VI projects have consistently displaced 
welfare recipients and other poor residents while accommodating citizens with the capacity to afford 
market-rate housing.    
The effects of white flight, accompanied by the transfer of most white school-aged children to 
suburban or private schools, solidified the homogenization of the New Orleans Public School District and 
the drastic decline in school quality (Lewis).  Following the Oil Bust of the mid-1980s, the city of New 
Orleans was overrun by rampant urban decay, crime, and unemployment; and the City’s population in 
poverty suffered most.  The absence of transit enhancements reinforced job isolation for poor workers 
in the New Orleans MSA.  New Orleans, like most U.S. cities, witnessed a surge in car ownership 
between 1900 and the years leading up to the Great Depression; it is estimated that the number of cars 
on New Orleans roads grew four-fold between 1916 and 1927 (Fairclough).  Restrictions on suburban 
expansion were further obviated by a number of important highway projects, including the construction 
of the I-10-Claiborne Expressway/I-610.  In 1956 and 1969, respectively, the first and second spans of 
the Causeway were opened to the public (Greater New Orleans Expressway Commission).  The world’s 
longest bridge, the Causeway, spans Lake Pontchartrain and connects suburban Jefferson and St 
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Tammany Parishes.  These jurisdictions, along with St Bernard Parish, have seen tremendous white 
population growth since the 1960s (R. Campanella Geographies of New Orleans: Urban Fabrics before 
the Storm; Cowan).  In 1958, the first bridge connecting New Orleans to parts of both Jefferson and 
Orleans Parishes on the West Bank of the Mississippi River – the Greater New Orleans (GNO) bridge – 
was opened to the public (Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development)9. 
Lewis points out that, although the City population nearly achieved black-white equilibrium in 
1980, by the year 2000 the ratio of blacks to whites in New Orleans was nearly three-to-one.  And in 
2004, not only were New Orleans Public Schools more than 90 percent African-American, but more than 
75 percent of the city’s students received free lunch or otherwise lunch at a reduced price (Morris).  In 
sum, “black people in New Orleans were disproportionately poor, and poor people in New Orleans were 
disproportionately black” (”Out of New Orleans” 470).  Ironically, Mosher, Keim et al. observe that 
“unlike other cities of the United States… New Orleans’s tourism and entertainment industry sold black 
people’s culture as part of the milieu of ethnicities in the city” while “the poor black population… was 
primarily consigned to the bottom of society” (474). 
     
 
Research Design 
 
Rationalizing the Approach: What is Known from Existing Data and Research 
This study employs a number of statistical approaches to answer the research questions.  Again, 
the first objective is to determine whether low-wage earners suffer from more or less spatial mismatch 
post-Katrina.  This can be addressed by using data on the residential and employment distribution of lo-
                                                          
9
 A second span was opened thirty years later to accommodate greater volumes of traffic and make this suburban 
haven that much more accessible by automobile. 
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wage-earners across the metro area.  The second objective is to determine whether low-wage-earners 
in suburban locations suffer from greater degrees of mismatch than those residing in the central-city.  
The residential and employment distribution data are combined to create an index to gauge the level of 
job accessibility by parish.  Both questions rely on data drawn from the U.S. Census Bureau.  The primary 
source is the U.S. Census Local Employment Dynamics (LED) OnTheMap tool, which aggregates 
employment data for the MSA by earner wages but not by race and ethnicity.  From a research 
perspective, there are additional factors driving the focus on low-wage workers rather than African-
American workers. 
Several important issues and trends emerge in the review of the New Orleans literature that 
renders New Orleans an exemplary case study in the area of spatial mismatch theory.  However, unlike 
the bulk of the spatial mismatch literature, this research does not focus on mismatch for black workers 
but on mismatch for poor workers.  First, urban development and residential distribution in New 
Orleans have historically been based on race and socioeconomic status; but interestingly and uniquely, 
development and settlement patterns have been dictated by topography and elevation.  Secondly, 
blacks in New Orleans have historically been poorer overall than whites (Hillery; Johnson; Spain).  And 
especially since Reconstruction, black New Orleanians have held a uniquely disadvantaged position, 
operating within a restrictive housing and labor market and under a “neo-plantation” style of local and 
state governance (McKittrick 56-57).  Several data reinforce these assertions and thus obviate the need 
for the study to center on black residential and employment distribution. 
Despite a slight reduction in the overall-versus-black poverty gap, African-American residents of 
the New Orleans metro in 2008 were still almost twice as likely to be poor as was the general 
population, even though the metro-wide African-American population declined by 22 percent between 
2000 and 2008.  This is congruent with the findings that 49.8 percent of the 2008 metro’s black 
population and 40.4 percent of the 2008 metro’s poor population is concentrated in Orleans Parish.  
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Moreover, the three parishes where black concentration is highest (Jefferson, Orleans and St. Tammany) 
are also those with the greatest shares of the MSA’s poor.   
This is significant for the purposes of measuring spatial mismatch because the core city is no 
longer home to the highest number of low-wage jobs. What is more striking, even though the 
proportion of the MSA’s black population fell by six percent and the proportion of the MSA population 
residing in the city fell by ten percent, approximately three out of five African-American metro residents 
were located in the core city in 2008.  This also broadly demonstrates the degree to which the 
importance of the central-city from an economic perspective has declined, and the importance of shifts 
in the focus and framework employed in the spatial mismatch research generally. 
Data from the 2000 Census reveal that blacks were the New Orleans MSA’s only nonwhite group 
whose majority resided in the city: roughly half of the MSA’s Asian population and approximately 55 
percent of the MSA’s Hispanic and Latino population resided in Jefferson Parish.  During the 1990s black 
and white New Orleans residents grew increasingly segregated, and black residents were most 
segregated from whites of any subgroup (J. B. Strait, Gang Gong, and Cherisha N. Williams).  Moreover, 
an examination of income distribution suggests that black households, both pre- and post-Katrina, were 
“much more likely to earn the lowest incomes and whites much more likely to earn the highest 
incomes” (Liu and Plyer).  The absence of a diversified economy as well as pronounced disparities in 
wealth between black households and all other households have restricted socioeconomic balance in 
the New Orleans metro area. 
The implications of the data analysis on low-wage commute patterns are also significant for the 
purposes of this study on spatial mismatch: the results here also indicate that low-wage-earners were 
much more adversely affected by market changes following Hurricane Katrina than were wage-earners 
overall.  While the number of overall wage-earners who work and live within the same parish of the 
New Orleans MSA fell by 24 percent, the number of low-wage-earner-residents across the metro area 
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fell by 46 percent.  More astoundingly, the number of low-wage in-commuters to the overall MSA 
declined by 17,559 – which is three times as much as the decline in the number of overall in-commuters.  
And while the number of overall out-commuters from the MSA and low-wage out-commuters from the 
MSA declined by virtually the same number – 20,032 and 19,815, respectively – the number of low-wage 
out-commuters declined by 30 percent, while the former declined by only nine percent. 
Six out of the seven parishes in the MSA experienced a decline in the number of low-wage in- 
and out-commuters in the years following Hurricane Katrina – which is indicative an overall exodus of 
people in poverty during the course of the city’s recovery.  The exception here is St. Tammany Parish: 
while only seeing a modest increase of 289 low-wage in-commuters, the parish still experienced an 
increase of almost three percent from its original 2004 low-wage in-commuter count.  While Jefferson 
Parish did not witness the highest loss of low-wage in-commuters by percentage, Jefferson Parish did 
experience the greatest decline in the number of low-wage in-commuters (more than 8,000)10.  Orleans 
Parish lost the greatest number of low-wage out-commuters (8,412, or approximately 30 percent) 
between 2004 and 2008; Jefferson Parish lost nearly 5,800 low-wage out-commuters (a decline of 27 
percent).  This is important when considering spatial mismatch, because the low-wage-earners may 
potentially suffer from greater mismatch post-Katrina despite a decline in the sheer number and volume 
of low-wage workers residing in the metro area. 
   
 
Variables and Indicators to Answer the Research Questions 
Another important factor dictating the research’s focus on low-wage workers, rather than on 
the African-American workforce, is the availability of data.  Some Census surveys pose a number of 
                                                          
10
 Orleans Parish came in second with a loss of nearly 7,000 low-wage in-commuters.  Still the greatest percentage 
loss of low-wage in- and out-commuters post-Katrina occurred in St. Bernard Parish: the estimated 2008 total for 
both groups is more than 4,000 low-wage commuters combined. 
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limitations for the purposes of this study because they are governed by criteria or methodology that is 
too restrictive; additionally, the frequency with which surveys are conducted and the youth of certain 
data sets also constrain the usefulness of some Census programs11.  At the local level, a wealth of 
information is available through the Greater New Orleans Community Data Center (GNOCDC), an 
established nonprofit organization that has consistently facilitated data analysis and reporting with the 
objective of fostering well-informed local policymaking since 1997.  In addition to supplying the public 
statistics on the socioeconomic and demographic shifts in New Orleans and the surrounding area dating 
back to the pre-Katrina period, since 2005 most of the GNOCDC’s research has addressed the most 
significant, often looming questions and issues pertaining to economic and population recovery in the 
city of New Orleans and in the region: repopulation and population distribution; housing and housing 
needs; the labor market and employment; quality of life; and income and affordability.  However, little 
literature exists on research that, side-by-side, focuses on both pre- and post-Katrina employment 
distribution in relation to residential distribution. 
The Census Local Employment Dynamics (LED) OnTheMap tool allows users to: (1) determine 
the location of jobs within a specified search area; (2) determine the residential and employment 
locations of workers of the study area (e.g., commute data); and (3) aggregate labor and population data 
by income level.  The program produces the results cartographically and as raw data in Microsoft Excel 
format12.  I utilize the U.S. Census American Community Survey, as well as Local Employment Data from 
the U.S. Census Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) and the Local Employment 
                                                          
11
 For example, the American Community Survey (ACS) database includes one-year and three-year estimates 
covering a range of demographic statistics; surveys used to calculate the one-year estimates are employed 
exclusively for geographic areas whose population is at least 65,000, while the three-year estimates are calculated 
for any geographic area whose population is at least 20,000.  Unfortunately for the purposes of this work, the 
annual 2008 estimates are only available for three of the seven parishes that make up the MSA (Jefferson, Orleans, 
and St. Tammany Parishes), and data is available for only two of the seven parishes (Jefferson and Orleans 
Parishes) in the annual 2004 estimates.  So while the ACS one-year estimates are available for the metro area 
(because its population is well in excess of 65,000) they are not available at the parish level. 
12
 One notable constraint of the data tool for the purposes of this study is the absence of aggregation of earnings 
and residential data by race and ethnicity. 
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Dynamics (LED) OnTheMap tool, to measure the concept of spatial mismatch to the degree that it exists 
in the New Orleans metro area over a four-year span, from 2004 to 2008. 
There is a sizeable portion of the existing literature on spatial mismatch that couches job 
isolation and socioeconomic disparity by evaluating the black urban experience.  However, thanks to 
various scholarly publications and to a wealth of Census data, several questions regarding the state of 
the pre-Katrina black community have already been answered, and the impacts of systemic 
discrimination on overall quality-of-life outcomes for New Orleans’ African-American residents and 
workers are well-documented (Johnson; Bates; Mosher, Keim and Franques).  Prior research 
demonstrates that (1) the majority of low-wage working residents in the MSA were located in the City; 
(2) the majority of the MSA’s poor population and majority of the metro area’s black population resided 
in the City; and (3) the metro area’s black poverty rate far exceeded the MSA’s overall poverty rate in 
2004.  “Indeed, Hurricane Katrina provided the state of Louisiana (through its largest city, New Orleans) 
as the model of how decades of public policies fostering constructions of race, class, and poverty 
produced… social and geographic segregation” (Lowe and Shaw 806). 
Given the disaster-related exodus of resources from the New Orleans area (e.g., residents and 
workers, jobs and employment firms), low-wage-earners of all backgrounds are now operating within a 
contracted labor market that was characterized by a disproportionately low number of moderate- and 
high-income jobs prior to Hurricane Katrina (Plyer and Ortiz).  Low-wage- earner residents in the post-
Katrina MSA are simultaneously forced to operate within a restrictive and increasingly unaffordable 
housing market.  The primary indicators used herein to operationalize the concept of spatial mismatch 
in the pre- and post-Katrina New Orleans metro are low-wage employment distribution, residential 
distribution, and commute behavior to determine job accessibility.  Each of the MSA’s parishes is 
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assigned an index value to determine the degree to which low-wage-earner residents suffer from spatial 
mismatch. 
 
 
Analysis and Findings 
 
Low-wage job index 
 The low-wage job index very simply expresses the ratio of low-wage jobs to low-wage-earner 
residents for each of the MSA’s seven parishes.  An index value greater than one (1.0) suggests an 
overabundance of low-wage jobs, relative to the number of low-income workers living in a particular 
parish.  Whereas an index value of less than one (1.0) is indicative of a lagging supply of low-wage 
employment, relative to the number of low-wage-earners residing in said parish. 
A comparison of the pre- and post-Katrina data indicate that – in order of least to greatest – 
each parish has maintained its relative position.  The lowest ratio value is found in St John the Baptist 
and the highest is found in Plaquemines Parish.  What is not demonstrable in this calculation is that the 
numbers of low-wage-earner residents increased since the storm in St Tammany Parish and St John the 
Baptist Parishes; nor can we gauge that the black population in both parishes have increased.   
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Table 1 
parish
low-wage job 
index, 2004
low-wage job 
index, 2008
%change, low-
wage job 
index
Jefferson 1.136 1.136 -0.02%
Orleans 1.020 1.099 7.73%
Plaquemines 1.200 1.164 -2.97%
St Bernard 0.765 0.744 -2.77%
St Charles 0.877 0.798 -9.08%
St John the 
Baptist 0.603 0.634 5.26%
St Tammany 0.922 1.008 9.31%
Low-Wage Job Index, 2004-2008
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics.  OnTheMap Version 4.1. 
 
 
Table 2 
2004 2008
St John the 
Baptist
St John the 
Baptist
St Bernard St Bernard
St Charles St Charles
St Tammany St Tammany
Orleans Orleans
Jefferson Jefferson
Plaquemines Plaquemines
Low-Wage Job Index: Parish 
Rankings (asc. order)
 
 
Low-wage residential and employment distributions 
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The residence and employment indexes used in this analysis are borrowed from Kain’s ratios, 
which appear in his seminal 1968 research on spatial mismatch.  The indexes, respectively, are 
calculated according to the equation:  
number of low-wage-earner residents x / number of overall wage-earner residents x  
and  
number of low-wage jobs x / number of jobs x, 
 
whereby “x” stands for “parish”.  The residence index for each parish is intended to measure the extent 
to which low-wage workers in each parish of the New Orleans metro area experience spatial mismatch 
relative to the general working population.  And the employment index is intended to measure the 
proportion of low-wage jobs that exist in each parish.  For the residence index, a greater index value 
indicates a higher percentage of residents who fall into the low-income category are located in a given 
parish: for instance, in 2008 approximately 18 percent of the workforce residing in Plaquemines Parish is 
considered ‘low-wage’.  The same applies to the employment index – whereby a greater index value 
suggests that a higher percentage of low-wage jobs are located in a particular parish.  For example, 20 
percent of the jobs in Orleans Parish are deemed ‘low-wage’ jobs in 2008. 
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Table 3 
parish
residence 
ratio, 2004
employment 
ratio, 2004
residence 
ratio, 2008
employment 
ratio, 2008
%change, 
residence 
ratio
%change, 
employment 
ratio
Jefferson 0.283                0.299                0.209                0.222                -26.22% -25.90%
Orleans 0.338                0.286                0.244                0.200                -27.69% -30.19%
Plaquemines 0.272                0.204                0.179                0.124                -34.40% -39.48%
St Bernard 0.294                0.404                0.208                0.224                -29.28% -44.62%
St Charles 0.258                0.230                0.202                0.162                -21.61% -29.30%
St John the 
Baptist 0.296                0.299                0.213                0.196                -27.88% -34.38%
St Tammany 0.278                0.345                0.223                0.280                -19.70% -18.83%
Residence and Employment Indexes, 2004-2008
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics.  OnTheMap Version 4.1. 
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Table 4 
2004 2008
St Charles Plaquemines
Plaquemines St Charles
St Tammany St Bernard
Jefferson Jefferson
St Bernard
St John the 
Baptist
St John the 
Baptist St Tammany
Orleans Orleans
Residence Index: Parish 
Rankings (asc. order)
 
 
What does the residence index say about spatial mismatch?  The residence index demonstrates 
the increase in the number of low-income workers residing in St Tammany Parish, as well as the decline 
in the number of low-wage-earners residing in Plaquemines Parish.  St Tammany Parish exhibited among 
the lowest residence index values before Katrina, whereas its ranking means that it is home to the 
second-highest concentration of low-wage earners by 2008.  The percentage of wage-earner-residents 
who are considered ‘low-income’ in St Bernard Parish declined by nearly nine percent between 2004 
and 2008.  This is largely a function of damage levels wrought by Hurricane Katrina, and is reflected in 
the drop-off in low-wage employment there: the change in the Parish’s ranking (from fifth to third out of 
seven) and index values suggest a marked decline in low-wage employment there. 
The parish rankings are important because, although the affordability of city living has 
decreased, Orleans Parish still houses the largest proportion of low-income residents relative to overall 
working residents.  However the city is no longer home to the highest proportion of low-wage 
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employment.  Moreover, St Tammany’s 2008 residence index value implies that the parish has moved 
much closer to the central-city, in terms of the number of poor workers housed therein. 
 
Table 5 
2004 2008
Plaquemines Plaquemines
St Charles St Charles
Orleans
St John the 
Baptist
St John the 
Baptist Orleans
Jefferson Jefferson
St Tammany St Bernard
St Bernard St Tammany
Employment Index: Parish 
Rankings (asc. order)
 
 
The employment index values indicate that the proportion of employment categorized as low-
wage has dropped off most significantly in St Bernard and Plaquemines Parishes, which is partly a 
reflection of the drop-off in employment in these parishes overall.  So what has attracted a greater 
percentage of low-wage-earner residents to post-Katrina St Tammany Parish by the year 2008?  St 
Tammany houses the highest percentage of low-wage employment relative to overall employment.  
Once again, it is clear that being a low-wage-earner resident in post-Katrina St Tammany affords poor 
workers the least drastic degrees of spatial mismatch. 
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Low-wage job accessibility 
 
Table 6 
accessibility 
index, 2004
accessibility 
index, 2008 %change
average 0.518 0.601 16.18%
parish
Jefferson 0.404 0.433 7.20%
Orleans 0.369 0.491 32.93%
Plaquemines 0.496 0.652 31.50%
St Bernard 0.572 0.769 34.63%
St Charles 0.663 0.714 7.73%
St John the 
Baptist 0.703 0.721 2.57%
St Tammany 0.417 0.429 2.89%
Job Accessibility Index by Parish, 2004-2008
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics.  OnTheMap Version 4.1. 
 
The accessibility index for each parish is intended to measure the extent to which low-wage 
workers in each parish of the New Orleans metro area experience spatial mismatch, or the degree to 
which low-wage-earners in each parish suffer from job isolation.  The index is calculated as follows: 
number of low-wage out-commuters x / number of low-wage-earner residents x 
whereby “x” stands for “parish”.  For the purposes of the last dimension of the data analysis, the 
accessibility index values for 2004 and 2008 are averaged across the seven parishes; the mean 
accessibility index values for 2004 and 2008, respectively, are 0.518 and 0.601.   
The accessibility index, derived from one of the earliest works on spatial mismatch theory, is 
used to provide a crude measure of the degree to which disadvantaged (e.g., low-skill, poor) workers 
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suffer from job isolation (Mooney).  Mathematically, a value of zero might indicate a jurisdiction with a 
high level of poverty – due to a high number of low-wage residents with none of them commuting out 
for work.  Conversely, a value of zero might indicate that the number of low-wage jobs and residents 
within the subarea is equal – thus allowing all low-wage residents therein to live and work in the same 
jurisdiction without having to commute.  On the flip side, a value of one might point to a balance in low-
wage residential and employment distribution but does not give any indication as to whether or how 
many of the subarea’s low-wage-earner residents are actually leaving the jurisdiction for work. 
 
Table 7 
2004 2008
Orleans St Tammany
Jefferson Jefferson
St Tammany Orleans
Plaquemines Plaquemines
St Bernard St Charles
St Charles St John
St John the 
Baptist St Bernard
Job Accessibility Index: Parish 
Rankings (asc. order)
 
 
To proxy overall low-wage job isolation for poor workers in the post-Katrina New Orleans MSA, 
low-wage mismatch is calculated by dividing the number of low-wage out-commuters by the number of 
low-wage-earner residents for each of the seven parishes.  Again, the average index values for 2004 and 
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2008 are 0.518 and 0.601, respectively.  Those parishes whose accessibility is determined to be below 
average are considered more favorable because the number of low-wage out-commuters (the 
numerator) is deemed to be lower than the number of low-wage-earner residents (the denominator). 
According to the estimated accessibility index, then, poor workers living in post-Katrina St. 
Tammany Parish are at the greatest spatial advantage with an index value of 0.429, while low-wage 
workers living in St. John the Baptist Parish in 2008 were at the greatest spatial disadvantage with an 
index value of 0.721.  The MSA’s three most populous parishes exhibit pre- and post-Katrina index 
values that indicate lesser degrees of low-wage job isolation.  However, contrary to 2004, Plaquemines 
Parish’s post-Katrina index value is above average, meaning that low-wage job isolation there actually 
increased as a result of distributional shifts following Hurricane Katrina. 
The results according to the accessibility measurement have significant implications for post-
Katrina job-isolation and spatial mismatch, not only for low-wage workers but also for African-American 
residents in the New Orleans metro area.  On the one hand, those low-wage workers residing in the 
post-Katrina core city enjoy relatively high access to suitable employment.  On the other hand, St. John 
the Baptist Parish has emerged as the only other jurisdiction, aside from Orleans Parish, whose 
population is majority-African-American.  And St. John is also the parish where low-wage workers are at 
the greatest spatial disadvantage and suffer from the greatest degree of low-wage job isolation. 
 Analysis of the commute-origin data for the New Orleans MSA indicates that low-wage-earner 
residents in the core city by 2008 emerged as the most disadvantaged from a spatial mismatch 
perspective.  Not only did Orleans Parish lose the greatest number of low-wage jobs but also saw the 
greatest decline of in the number of low-wage residents able to work and live in the same jurisdiction.  
Indeed, the ratio of low-wage in-commuters to out-commuters for the city grew between 2004 and 
2008 – even though the number of jobs and commuters declined drastically overall.  Alternatively, it can 
be argued that the impacts of hurricane-related events (e.g., wind damage and flooding) on the supply 
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of housing stock (Plyer et al.) have decreased spatial mismatch in places like St Bernard Parish but 
increased mismatch in Orleans Parish.   
Overall, the results may buttress speculation that poor workers are seemingly suffering from 
greater mismatch because they are constrained by increased cost-of-living while at the same time 
seemingly as reliant on arguably the most unaffordable mode of transit – private automobile.  
Simultaneously, the percentage of workers in poverty who took public transportation to work declined 
between 2004 and 2008.  Presumably, this segment of the metro workforce would rely on public transit 
if it were still a reliable means of travel-to-work.  Thus, spatial mismatch for poor metro workers has 
grown particularly acute for those living in outlying parishes with inadequate public transit provision.  
And those parishes whose post-Katrina public transit networks are most robust and reliable – namely, 
Orleans Parish, and to a lesser degree, Jefferson Parish – are precisely where the highest concentration 
of low-wage jobs are now located, and are arguably home to the least-affordable housing. 
  
 
Conclusion and Policy Implications 
The findings of this spatial mismatch study contribute to the New Orleans literature and to the spatial 
mismatch literature by employing commonly-used methodologies and measurements to estimate the 
degree to which post-Katrina demographic and market shifts have influenced job accessibility for the 
poor and for low-wage workers in the seven-parish metropolitan statistical area.  Consequently, the 
research questions and research design highlight the significance of both race and place.  The study is 
not restricted to gauging the effect of either one of these facets of mismatch and instead relies on a 
range of measurements to demonstrate their interrelatedness – this serves to support and strengthen 
the research questions and arguments but also to better inform post-Katrina policymaking.  The major 
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findings are that low-wage working residents in the suburbs directly adjacent to the city, Jefferson and 
St. Tammany Parishes, experienced a decrease in mismatch, while low-wage workers in the smaller and 
more rural suburbs are experiencing increased spatial mismatch.  The majority of the metro area’s poor 
population no longer lives in the City, and the fringe suburbs have seen their shares increase.  
Coincidentally, the outlying suburbs of St Tammany and St John the Baptist Parishes have seen their 
shares of population in poverty and black population increase since Katrina.  The data preclude the 
study from determining whether these parishes increased their shares of blacks in poverty.  
The GNOCDC tells us that housing can be defined as affordable when one’s rent (or mortgage 
payment) and utilities consume 30 percent or less of a worker’s pre-tax wages .  Accordingly, cost-
burden results when rent and utilities exceed 30 percent of monthly pre-tax wages.  Post-Katrina 
housing affordability has decreased and cost burden has consequently increased: almost 60 percent of 
renters (compared to only 30 percent of homeowners) within the city are cost-burdened; and the 
majority of the MSA’s poor population reside in the suburbs (Liu and Plyer).  This is significant because 
(1) low-wage earners are more likely to rent, and (2) almost half (47 percent) of full-time workers in the 
MSA earn less than $35,000 annually. 
The literature review reveals that land-use policy and planning have consistently been 
inextricably linked to the prevailing socioeconomic dynamics of the urban environment over time; these 
two facets of spatial mismatch, moreover, are mutually reinforcing.  This analysis demonstrates that 
low-wage workers in particular suffer from constrained mobility following Katrina as well as from 
increased dispersal, which begs the question: how can policymakers best facilitate low-wage mobility, 
on the one hand, and influence the siting of low-wage firms and jobs on the other hand?  Although the 
new New Orleans may be smaller as measured by population size, in reality it is in many ways larger as a 
result of increased population and job sprawl – thus rendering non-motorized transportation 
increasingly more inconvenient for those low-wage workers living away from the core city.  And to be 
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sure, they are residing increasingly farther from the metro center.  However, public-transit services have 
not been expanded accordingly, due not only to local fiscal capacity, job sprawl and worker sprawl, but 
also because there has been very little in the way of inter-parish or regional transportation planning.  
Thus, spatial mismatch has markedly increased from a mobility standpoint, as well as from the 
perspective of increased job dispersal.  And local leaders and policymakers are at a distinct disadvantage 
having to plan for a more widely scattered constituency with fewer resources available. 
Since Hurricane Katrina, among the most glaring and critical challenges to effective policymaking 
to post-disaster recovery are: notable increases in cost-of-living; scarcity of affordable housing; and the 
homogenous nature of the local economy.  Post-Katrina, 70 percent of low-cost rental housing units, 81 
percent of the public housing stock, 80 percent of units receiving housing vouchers, and 80 percent of 
subsidized housing was either damaged or damaged beyond repair; meanwhile, rental costs nearly 
tripled (Lowe and Shaw 806).  The first two issues are clearly interrelated – however, the pace of public 
and subsidized housing development can arguably be traced in part to intense, deeply rooted civic and 
political opposition and NIMBYism.  The diversity of the job market in metro New Orleans has 
historically constrained and continues to constrain the growth of a middle class.  The New Orleans 
economy has been consistently characterized by a disproportionately low number of moderate- and 
high-income jobs (Plyer and Ortiz). 
The existing post-Katrina research indicates that the nature and focus of most post-disaster 
recovery programs center on homeowners and commercial entities – meanwhile, 23 percent of workers 
aged 16 and older earn less than $15,000 annually and 47 percent of full-time metro workers earn less 
than $35,000 annually.  Without incentivizing future aid to renters in the New Orleans metro, cost-
burden and low-wage residents will continue to suffer – thus hindering the possibility for the growth of 
a post-Katrina middle class.  Secondly, the absence of comprehensive regional planning, coupled with 
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fragmented local land-use and housing policymaking among the MSA’s parishes, precludes leaders from 
realizing the potential collective benefits of sound post-disaster urban planning. 
What accounts for variations in spatial mismatch for (a) low-wage working residents in the City 
and (b) low-wage working residents of the suburbs?  Poor workers residing and working in the City may 
actually be at a disadvantage due to increased cost-of-living at the center (Greater New Orleans 
Community Data Center).  Suburban low-wage-earners are less reliant on city jobs but are still residing 
increasingly far from low-wage jobs in peripheral suburbs like Jefferson Parish and increasingly residing 
in more outlying parishes like St. John the Baptist. 
This study represents a mere but important drop in the bucket that is the body of post-Katrina 
research; the data sources used herein can be utilized to inform a broad range of research questions.  
For example, the accessibility index might be employed to gauge the degree to which residents are 
isolated from public transit modes.  The index might also be used to measure racial and ethnic 
residential isolation.  The Census LED data can be used to measure non-MSA mismatch – in other words, 
the extent to which workers residing in the MSA are forced to work outside its boundaries.  The Census-
defined New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, LA MSA defines the geographic focus of this study.  However, 
increased job sprawl and the declining economic dominance of the City of New Orleans itself 
necessitates that future research on the metro area include an expanded geographic query – perhaps 
one that includes those parishes directly adjacent to the MSA parishes (Plyer and Ortiz).  Another logical 
next step stemming from this analysis would be to employ the recently released decennial Census data 
for a direct, longitudinal analysis of post-Katrina population and employment shifts (similar to that of 
R.W. Martin) – thereby reinforcing accuracy by using a consistent data source rather than several.   
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